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Much remains unknown regarding the relationship between anxiety,
worry, sustained attention, and frontal function. Here, we addressed
this using a sustained attention task adapted for functional magnetic
resonance imaging. Participants responded to presentation of simple
stimuli, withholding responses to an infrequent “No Go” stimulus.
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) activity to “Go” trials, and
dorsal anterior cingulate (dACC) activity to “No Go” trials were associ-
ated with faster error-free performance; consistent with DLPFC and
dACC facilitating proactive and reactive control, respectively. Trait
anxiety was linked to reduced recruitment of these regions, slower
error-free performance, and decreased frontal-thalamo-striatal con-
nectivity. This indicates an association between trait anxiety and
impoverished frontal control of attention, even when external distrac-
tors are absent. In task blocks where commission errors were made,
greater DLPFC-precuneus and DLPFC-posterior cingulate connectivity
were associated with both trait anxiety and worry, indicative of
increased off-task thought. Notably, unlike trait anxiety, worry was
not linked to reduced frontal-striatal-thalamo connectivity, impover-
ished frontal recruitment, or slowed responding during blocks
without commission errors, contrary to accounts proposing a direct
causal link between worry and impoverished attentional control.
This leads us to propose a new model of the relationship between
anxiety, worry and frontal engagement in attentional control versus
off-task thought.
Keywords: anxiety, frontal function, off-task thought, sustained attention,
worry
Introduction
Worry and difﬁculty concentrating are symptomatic of General-
ized Anxiety Disorder and also characteristic of the subclinical
anxiety experienced by many individuals. The extent to which
these symptoms reﬂect disruption to common versus unique
underlying mechanisms remains unclear. An important ques-
tion is whether heightened worrying is secondary to deﬁcits in
the frontal cortical control of attention or an independent
feature of anxiety, understudied in terms of its brain mechan-
isms. Here, we addressed this by investigating the relationship
between anxiety, worry, the frontal control of sustained atten-
tion, and off-task thought.
Concentration problems reported by anxious individuals
suggest deﬁcits in sustained attention. These problems can lead
to impaired occupational function. Despite this, the link
between anxiety and impoverished sustained attention has not
been extensively investigated. Instead, many models of anxiety
have focused on selective attention; in particular, the capture of
visual attention by threat-related stimuli. In an experimental
setting, this entails slowing in the processing of task-relevant
neutral stimuli or stimulus dimensions when threat-related infor-
mation is present. This slowing is increased in high trait anxious
and clinically anxious individuals (Macleod and Mathews 1988;
Richards and Millwood 1989). These attentional capture effects
were initially proposed to result from ampliﬁcation of a pre-
attentive threat signal (Mathews and Mackintosh 1998; Mogg
and Bradley 1998). However, recent evidence suggests that
anxiety may involve a deﬁcit in augmenting attentional control
to support processing of task-relevant stimuli when competition
from salient distractors is present (Bishop et al. 2004; Bishop
2009). Speciﬁcally, anxious individuals show impoverished re-
cruitment of frontal cortical regions implicated in attentional
control. This is observed regardless of whether attentional com-
petition is created by threat-related stimuli (Bishop et al. 2004,
2007) or response conﬂict in the absence of emotional stimuli
(Bishop 2009). Frontal regions implicated in the disrupted
control of selective attention in anxiety have included the dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC), (Bishop et al. 2004, 2007; Bishop 2009).
A number of theoretical models have attempted to specify
the roles of DLPFC and ACC in attentional control (e.g.,
Botvinick et al. 1999). Recently, several models have focused
on a distinction between “proactive” and “reactive” control
(Braver et al. 2007; Aron 2011). The latter is held to involve
on the spot recruitment of attentional mechanisms to inhibit
prepotent responses and overcome processing interference
caused by task-irrelevant distractors. It has been proposed
that DLPFC and ACC are jointly involved in reactive control
(Braver et al. 2007), with different accounts varying as to the
precise role attributed to each region (Carter et al. 2000;
Nachev 2006; Botvinick 2007; Morishima et al. 2010). DLPFC
has also been implicated in proactive control, in particular
the active maintenance and updating of current goals,
and use of this to adjust behavior (Braver and Barch 2006;
Braver et al. 2007).
Proactive and reactive control are both held to facilitate per-
formance of sustained attention tasks (Aron 2011). These tasks
are typically simple and fairly monotonous, requiring a key
press response to certain stimuli and inhibition of response to
others. External distractors are absent (i.e., there is no concur-
rent competition between target and distractor stimuli). For
example, in the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART;
Robertson et al. 1997), participants are asked to respond quickly
but accurately to a series of “Go” stimuli while withholding
responses to occasionally presented “No Go” stimuli. The infre-
quent nature of the No Go stimuli necessitates the proactive
control of sustained attention across Go trials in order to main-
tain task goals (i.e., to avoid responding so fast that it is difﬁcult
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to brake when a No Go stimulus is encountered). Computational
theories suggest that such proactive, ongoing control of sus-
tained attention may be achieved by recurrent activation within
lateral prefrontal regions or frontal-thalamo loops. This recurrent
activation is held to enable active maintenance of current goal
states. Updating of these states is achieved by input from striatal
regions (Beiser and Houk 1998; Frank et al. 2001). It has been
suggested that such proactive control of attention is complimen-
ted by phasic recruitment of DLPFC and ACC to facilitate
response inhibition (i.e., “reactive control”) upon the actual oc-
currence of No Go trials (Fassbender et al. 2004). The concen-
tration problems reported by anxious individuals suggest a
deﬁcit in proactive control processes supporting the mainten-
ance of sustained attention. This might either occur alone or be
accompanied by disruption to reactive attentional control pro-
cesses.
Worry is a common feature of many anxiety disorders (ADs)
and included in the diagnostic criteria of Generalized Anxiety
Disorder (Olatunji et al. 2011). It has been deﬁned as “a chain
of thoughts and images” that are “negatively affect laden and
relatively uncontrollable” (Borkovec et al. 1983). Standardized
self-report measures have been developed to measure the
extent of worry shown by different individuals (Meyer et al.
1990). The relationship between worry and impoverished at-
tentional control has been subject to discussion within the cog-
nitive literature. One common proposal is that there are limited
executive resources. It is suggested that the extent to which
these resources are allocated to maintaining attention control
versus engaged in worry-related cognition is altered in anxious
individuals. Such a shift in balance might either reﬂect worry
occupying processing resources that would otherwise be allo-
cated to attentional control (Eysenck 1979) or impoverished at-
tentional control resulting in more processing resources being
allocated to worry.
An alternative theoretical stance is suggested by the mind-
wandering literature. Mind-wandering has been deﬁned as in-
volving a shift of attention away from external stimuli (Barron
et al. 2011) and representations associated with ongoing activi-
ties and goals (McVay and Kane 2010) to occupation with spon-
taneously generated task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs). This
literature has been fairly isolated from that on worry despite
obvious theoretical connections. According to McVay and Kane
(2010), mind-wandering is the product of both impoverished
control of attention and increased interference from automati-
cally elicited personal concern-related thoughts. Worry-related
cognition is arguably a subclass of personal concern-related
thought processes. Hence, a logical extension to McVay and
Kane’s position is that worry might entail the spontaneous gen-
eration and occupation with negative self-referent thoughts, but
that this might be orthogonal to individual differences in atten-
tional control. Where individuals fall on this latter control di-
mension might impact the ease with which worry-related
thoughts can be dismissed at will, when concentration needs to
be maintained on task performance. This could in turn explain
the observation that worry is perceived as more uncontrollable
and disruptive to everyday life when it occurs in the context of
anxiety (Olatunji et al. 2011), due to its increased co-occurrence
with impoverished attentional control.
The SART task has previously been used to investigate the
role of DLPFC in the maintenance of task-focused attention
(Fassbender et al. 2004). However, it has also been used to
investigate individual differences in mind-wandering (Christoff
et al. 2009). In this latter work, TUTs were reported to be
associated with co-recruitment of “Default Mode” (precuneus,
posterior cingulate) regions and “Executive” regions including
DLPFC. If anxiety is not only associated with impoverished
proactive control of sustained attention, but also with in-
creased spontaneous off-task thought (i.e., worry), a key chal-
lenge will be to dissociate engagement of DLPFC in each of
these processes. In the current study, we aimed to accomplish
this by investigating changes in DLPFC activation and connec-
tivity as a function of both within-subject performance on an
fMRI-optimized version of the SART task, and between-subject
measures of individual differences.
Our hypotheses were as follows. First, that trait anxiety
would be associated with impoverished proactive maintenance
of sustained attention, with this being reﬂected by reduced
DLPFC activation and reduced connectivity between DLPFC
and thamalo-striatal regions across SART “Go” trials. A related
but more open question was whether trait anxiety-related deﬁ-
cits in attentional control would extend to include impover-
ished reactive control and reduced recruitment of DLPFC and
ACC on No Go trials. Our second hypothesis was that trait
anxiety would independently be linked to increased DLPFC
engagement in off-task thought, with this being accompanied
by increased DLPFC-Default Mode network connectivity.
Given previous TUT ﬁndings (Christoff et al. 2009), it was
anticipated that this would be observed to a greatest extent in
blocks containing commission errors. Our third hypothesis
was that individual differences in worry, as assessed by the
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ, Meyer et al. 1990)
would be positively correlated with extent of DLPFC engage-
ment in off-task thought, and DLPFC–default mode connec-
tivity, but would be orthogonal to individual differences in
frontal engagement in attentional control. Together, these
hypotheses reﬂected our underlying proposal that there are 2
separate dimensions of function that vary across participants
that predispose individuals to 1) spontaneous negative cogni-
tions (worry) and 2) impoverished attentional control, with the
joint function of the position an individual has on each of
these dimensions being linked to trait vulnerability to anxiety.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Participants were recruited from volunteer databases. Individuals with
a history of psychiatric care, neurological disease, or head injury were
excluded, as were individuals on psychotropic medication or contra-
indicated for MRI participation. The study was approved by the UC
Berkeley Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects and carried
out in compliance with their guidelines. All participants gave written
informed consent. Twenty-three right-handed adults aged 18–26 years
with normal or corrected vision took part. Five were excluded due to
problems staying awake and performing the task (omission errors >
10%). The ﬁnal sample comprised 15 females and 3 males, mean
age = 21.5 years, SD = 2.3 years.
Procedure
During the main session, participants performed an fMRI optimized
version of the SART (Robertson et al. 1997; Fassbender et al. 2004)
within a Siemens 3T Tim Trio MRI scanner. Prior to entering the
scanner, they completed the Spielberger State Trait Anxiety Inventory
(STAI; Spielberger et al. 1983) and the PSWQ followed by a practice
run of the SART task. The STAI trait subscale is a widely used measure
of trait vulnerability to anxiety. Scores on this subscale are elevated in
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individuals meeting criteria for ADs across subtypes (Bieling et al.
1998; Chambers et al. 2004) and predict future AD diagnosis (Plehn
and Peterson 2002). Some of the STAI trait subscale items assess
general propensity to negative affect, others are related to cognitive
style, and others to physiological arousal. The PSWQ was developed to
more speciﬁcally assess the construct of worry. It shows high internal
consistency and good test re-test reliability (Meyer et al. 1990). The
PSWQ is the predominant measure of worry used in both healthy and
clinical populations.
Within the scanner, localizer and structural scans were obtained and
participants performed 6 6-min “runs” of the SART task while fMRI
data were acquired. Visual stimuli were back-projected onto a screen
behind the bore of the magnet and viewed via an angled mirror above
the participant’s head. In SART task blocks, participants were pre-
sented with single digits in a randomized order. Participants were in-
structed to press a button with their right index ﬁnger for every digit
that appeared (“Go” trials) with the exception of the digit “3” (No Go
trials). Each trial comprised digit presentation (250 ms) followed by
mask presentation (750–1050 ms, mean = 900 ms), Figure 1. Digit size
varied from trial to trial, subtending 1.4° × 1° to 3° × 2.1° visual angle.
Masks were light grey ovals containing a cross, subtending 3° × 2.9°.
No Go stimuli occurred infrequently, 2 or 3 times per block of 28
digits. There were 30 SART task blocks. These were alternated with
control task blocks in which stimuli were letters and there were only
“Go” trials (i.e., participants pressed for every letter). These provided a
control for the low level perceptual and motor demands of the SART
task while placing less demand on sustained attention and response
inhibition. A 2400-ms cue indicating block type was presented at the
beginning of each block.
Participants were invited to return for a follow-up session in which
they performed a vigilance task with thought probes to directly assess
individual differences in mind-wandering. This was completed on a
computer in a behavioral testing room. Participants were shown a
series of crosses at ﬁxation, with a presentation time per cross of 100
ms and interstimulus interval of 1400 ms. Each cross subtended 9° × 9°
visual angle, this decreased to 5° × 5° on 10% of trials. Participants re-
sponded to the smaller crosses by speeded button press. Every 48–80
trials, participants were presented with a “thought probe” asking
“What were you thinking just now?” and instructed to press “A” if their
thoughts had been task-related, “Z” if task-unrelated. Prior to task per-
formance, participants were given deﬁnitions and examples of
task-related and task-unrelated thoughts, and completed a practice set
of trials with one thought probe. A score was calculated for each par-
ticipant indicating the percentage of probes for which they reported
task-unrelated thoughts. This score was used as an index of mind-
wandering, that is, attention being “switched,” or at least partially real-
located, to off-task thoughts (McVay and Kane 2010). Fourteen partici-
pants (78%) completed this additional session, on average 3 months
after the SART session.
fMRI Data Acquisition
Blood oxygenation level–dependent (BOLD) contrast functional
images were acquired with echo-planar T2*-weighted (EPI) imaging
using a 12-channel head coil. Each image volume comprised 36 3 mm
thick slices (interslice gap: 0.75 mm; inplane resolution: 3.5 × 3.5 mm;
ﬂip angle: 78°; echo time: 30 ms; bandwidth: 2232 Hz; repetition time:
2210 ms). Slice acquisition was descending and axial oblique, angled
to avoid the eyeballs and to maximize whole brain coverage. Data were
acquired in 6 6-min scanning runs. The ﬁrst 5 volumes of each run
were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects. T1-weighted struc-
tural images were acquired at a resolution of 1 × 1 × 1 mm.
fMRI Imaging Analysis
This was conducted using SPM5 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroima-
ging, London, UK). Images were converted from DICOM to NIfTI
format. Following this, diagnostics were run on the time-series for each
imaging run. Volumes characterized by unusually high changes in
volume to volume signal intensity (assessed using the mean squared
signal change across the brain) were marked as bad volumes and re-
placed by interpolation of the volumes on either side. (This approach
is closely related to those adopted by Power et al. 2012 and Carp
2011). Regressors were created to model out the (replaced) volumes in
the ﬁnal analysis. These bad volumes tend to correspond to those with
notable movement spikes (in line with ﬁndings by Power et al. 2012).
Subsequent to this initial data cleaning step, image realignment (cor-
recting for head movement) was conducted, followed by slice time cor-
rection, and normalization of each participant’s EPI data to the MNI
template (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al. 2002). Images were resampled into
this space with 2 mm isotropic voxels and smoothed with a Gaussian
kernel of 8 mm FWHM.
General linear modeling of the BOLD data was conducted within
SPM 5. Regions of interest (ROIs) were created for right DLPFC and
dorsal ACC (dACC) using 10 mm radius spheres centered on peak acti-
vations from a meta-analysis of cognitive control tasks (Duncan and
Owen 2000) as described previously (Bishop et al. 2008). The MNI co-
ordinates for the center of these spherical ROIs were as follows: right
DLPFC 42, 24, 24; dACC 0, 30, 21.
Two linear models were created. In both models, in addition to re-
gressors of interest, realignment (movement) regressors, regressors
indicating volumes where “bad scans” had been replaced by interp-
olation of neighboring volumes, and mean time-series extracted from
white matter and outside of brain masks were included to reduce
task-unrelated variance (noise). In the ﬁrst model, SART Go, SART No
Go, and Control Go trials were modeled by delta functions convolved
with the canonical hemodynamic response function to form regres-
sors. Building on prior work (e.g., Fassbender et al. 2004), we worked
on the premise that engagement of frontal regions in response inhi-
bition (reactive control) would best be indexed by activity on No Go
trials, while engagement of frontal regions in the maintenance of sus-
tained attention (proactive control) would best be indexed by activity
across Go trials in SART blocks relative to activity across Go trials in
Control blocks.
A limitation of this ﬁrst model was the possibility that DLPFC activity
across Go trials might also reﬂect engagement in off-task self-referential
thought processes. This might obscure any link between trait anxiety
and reduced DLPFC engagement in the proactive maintenance of sus-
tained attention. Hence, in our second model, SART blocks were broken
Figure 1. The sustained attention to response task (SART), adapted for functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). In SART blocks, participants responded by key
press to all digits except the digit “3”, these “No Go” trials were infrequent (2 or 3 per
block of 28). In Control blocks, participants responded by key press to all letters; in
these blocks there were only “Go” trials.
Cerebral Cortex March 2015, V 25 N 3 611
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/cercor/article-abstract/25/3/609/346200 by guest on 22 O
ctober 2019
down, on a subject-by-subject basis, according to whether or not errors
of commission were made on No Go trials within each block. (One par-
ticipant did not achieve error-free performance in any block and hence
was excluded from analyses using this model. The remaining partici-
pants made errors during a minimum of 4 of the 30 SART blocks,
M = 18, SD = 7.37. The number of blocks containing commission errors
did not vary signiﬁcantly as a function of trait anxiety, P > 0.1). This gave
5 regressors of interest: Control Gos, SART Error-Free (EF) block Gos,
SART EF block No Gos, SART Error-Made (EM) block Gos, SART EM
block No Gos. Given the performance decrement often associated with
off-task thought (Christoff et al. 2009), we reasoned that DLPFC activity
to Go trials in blocks where commission errors were made on No Go
trials was likely to have a greater component attributable to off-task
thought than DLPFC activity to Go trials in blocks where no commission
errors were made (note the blocks are split by errors on No Go trials). In
contrast, we anticipated that DLPFC recruitment to Go trials within EF
blocks would provide a less contaminated measure of DLPFC engage-
ment in the proactive control of sustained attention.
These models were used to conduct both ROI-based activation ana-
lyses and also ROI-seeded functional connectivity analyses. The latter
allowed us to examine the regions with which DLPFC was co-activated,
across Go trials, as a function of SART block type (i.e., EF vs EM). This
enabled us to investigate whether the patterns of DLPFC functional
connectivity observed were consistent with differential engagement in
proactive control of sustained attention versus off-task thought.
The ROI activation analyses were conducted using the MARSBAR
toolbox (Brett et al. 2002). We extracted the mean activity associated
with each task regressor from right DLPFC and dACC ROIs, on a
subject-by-subject basis. These activation indices were then submitted
to analyses of covariance with STAI trait anxiety scores or PSWQ worry
scores entered as the covariate of interest. Greenhouse–Geisser esti-
mates were used to correct for violations of sphericity.
Psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analyses (Friston 1997; Gitel-
man et al. 2003) were used to examine changes in functional connec-
tivity between regions of interest as a function of SART block type (EF
or EM) and participant anxiety or worry levels. Using right DLPFC as a
“seed” region, we investigated changes in the regions with which right
DLPFC was co-activated across Go trials by block type (SART EM or
SART EF vs. Control) and STAI trait or PSWQ scores. We restricted
these analyses to consideration of a number of a priori ROIs. Speciﬁ-
cally, the MNI Automated Anatomical Labeling (AAL) template was
used to deﬁne ROIs for “Default Mode” regions implicated in self-
referential processing (bilateral precuneus and posterior cingulate) as
well as regions held, together with DLPFC, to support the proactive
control of sustained attention and maintenance of task goals (bilateral
thalamus, caudate). Subject-wise estimates of mean functional connec-
tivity between right DLPFC and these 8 target ROIs were calculated for
1) Go trials in SART EF blocks versus Control blocks and 2) Go trials in
SART EM blocks versus Control blocks. This enabled us to test speciﬁc
hypotheses about DLPFC co-activation with these target regions as a
function of SART performance while avoiding problems of multiple
comparisons and effect size inﬂation associated with selection of peak
voxels from voxelwise connectivity maps (Vul et al. 2009).
No Go trials were modeled with a single regressor. As an additional
check, the analyses described above were repeated with No Go trials
broken down into “correct” and “error” trials. Effectively, in a block
labeled as containing errors, this distinguished which No Go trials
were performed correctly and which were not. These additional ana-
lyses did not result in any notable differences in the results obtained.
Results
DLPFC and dACC Activity During Sustained Attention
Task Performance
Dorsal ACC activity was greater for SART No Go trials than for
SART Go or Control Go trials, t(17) = 5.02, P < 0.001, t
(17) = 5.48, P < 0.001, respectively, and did not differ between
SART Go and Control Go trials (P > 0.1). This is consistent with
the proposed role of dACC in reactive control—speciﬁcally in
response inhibition (Braver et al. 2007). Right DLPFC activity
was also greatest for SART No Go trials, but this did not differ
signiﬁcantly from activity for SART Go trials, t(17) = 1.70,
P > 0.1. Further, both SART No Go and Go trials showed greater
right DLPFC activity than Control Go trials, t(17) = 2.15, P < 0.05,
t(17) = 2.41, P < 0.05, respectively. This is in line with right
DLPFC playing a role in the proactive control of sustained atten-
tion across SART Go trials, as well as in reactive control as ob-
served in response to SART No Go stimuli. Additional evidence
for the respective importance of right DLPFC to proactive
control and dACC to reactive control comes from the ﬁnding that
right DLPFC activity across SART Go trials (vs. Control Go trials)
and dACC activity to SART No Go trials both signiﬁcantly pre-
dicted faster speed of error-free performance, r(18) =−0.48,
P = 0.05, r(18) =−0.84, P < 0.001, respectively, but this was not
the case for the reverse contrasts (DLPFC to No Gos, dACC to
SART Go vs. Control Go trials, Ps > 0.1).
Trait Anxiety and Frontal Recruitment to No Go Trials
Trait anxiety was associated with both lower dACC and lower
DLPFC activity to SART No Go trials (dACC: r(18) =−0.70,
P < 0.05; DLPFC: r(18) =−0.53, P < 0.05), Figure 2. When this
analysis was repeated for only correct No Go trials, both associ-
ations remained signiﬁcant (dACC: r(18) =−0.80, P < 0.05;
DLPFC: r(18) =−0.58, P < 0.05). This is in line with trait anxiety
being associated with reduced reactive control upon the occur-
rence of infrequent No Go trials.
Trait Anxiety and DLPFC Recruitment to Go Trials
Examination of DLPFC activity to Go trials as a function of
block type (SART EF, SART EM, Control (C)) revealed a
striking differential pattern of recruitment as a function of trait
anxiety, F(2, 30) = 7.44, P < 0.005. High trait anxiety was
associated with reduced DLPFC activity to Go trials in SART EF
blocks and increased DLPFC activity to Go trials in SART EM
blocks, Figure 3a,b. DLPFC activity to Go trials in EF (vs.
Control) blocks was associated with faster error-free perform-
ance, r(17) =−0.51, P < 0.05, Figure 3c, which in turn was
negatively associated with trait anxiety, r(17) = 0.50, P < 0.05
(i.e., trait anxiety was linked to longer reactions times (RTs)—
hence the positive correlation coefﬁcient), Figure 3d. In
Figure 2. Trait anxiety was associated with reduced activity in both dorsal ACC and
right DLPFC ROIs for SART No Go trials versus baseline (the BOLD signal was averaged
across each ROI for each participant). dACC, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; DLPFC,
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; SART, Sustained Attention to Response Task.
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contrast, DLPFC activity to Go trials in EM (vs. Control) blocks
was unrelated to RT measures, Ps > 0.1. This provides initial
tentative support for the contention that DLPFC activity across
Go trials in SART blocks where no commission errors are
made primarily reﬂects engagement of this region in proactive
attentional control, facilitating fast error-free task performance,
but that DLPFC activity in blocks containing commission
errors may, at least in part, reﬂect an alternate process, such as
engagement in off-task thought. There was no signiﬁcant
relationship between trait anxiety and dACC activity to Go
trials in either EF (vs. Control) or EM (vs. Control) blocks
(Ps > 0.4).
Further support for 2 distinct dimensions of function being
captured by DLPFC activity to Go trials in EF versus EM blocks
was obtained from a hierarchical regression analysis; this
showed that these 2 indices had not only opposite but additive
effects in predicting trait vulnerability to anxiety, Table 1. This is
consistent with anxiety being linked to both impoverished en-
gagement of DLPFC in the proactive control of sustained atten-
tion and increased activation of this region by off-task thought.
It also suggests that there is not a direct trade-off between en-
gagement of DLPFC resources in one of these processes versus
the other.
The extent of differential DLPFC activity during SART EM
versus SART EF blocks was not only very strongly linked to trait
anxiety, r(18) = 0.65, P < 0.005, but also strongly linked to the
mind-wandering index—of intrusion into conscious awareness
of TUTs—measured during the vigilance task conducted in the
follow-up session, r(13) = 0.69, P < 0.01. As in the case for trait
anxiety, hierarchical regression analysis indicated that increased
DLPFC activity to Go trials in SART blocks containing commis-
sion errors (relative to Control block Go trials) and decreased
Figure 3. Anxiety, DLPFC activation and SART performance. (a) Right DLPFC activity on SART Go trials - Control Go trials is plotted against STAI trait anxiety as a function of block type
(EF, commission Error-Free; EM, commission Error-Made; C, Control). (b) To illustrate this result further, we used a median split on STAI trait anxiety scores to show DLPFC activation on
Go trials by block type (Sart Error-Free, Sart Error-Made, Control) and anxiety level (low, high). Trial-speciﬁc activity is calculated against the implicit baseline. (c) DLPFC activation on Go
trials in Error-Free (vs. Control) blocks is linked to faster error-free performance. (d) Trait anxiety, in turn, is linked to slower error-free performance. DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex;
SART, Sustained Attention to Response Task; STAI, Spielberger State Trait Anxiety Inventory.
Table 1
Hierarchical regression models predicting participants’ level of trait anxiety
Predictors β P R2 for model Adj. R2 P for model
a Right DLPFC to Go trials EF-C
Right DLPFC to Go trials EM-C
−0.67
0.47
0.007
0.045
0.44 0.36 0.017
b Right DLPFC to Go trial EF-C
Worry (PSWQ scores)
Right DLPFC to go trial EM-C
(*excluded)
−0.52
0.63
*0.15
0.006
0.001
*0.47
0.65 0.59 0.001
Notes: DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; EF, Commission Error-Free SART block; EM, Commission Error-Made SART block; C, Control block; PSWQ, Penn State Worry Questionnaire.
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DLPFC activity to Go trials in SART EF blocks (relative to
Control block Go trials) had additive effects in prediction of
TUT scores, β DLPFC EF-C =−0.69, P < 0.01, β DLPFC
EM-C = 0.62, P < 0.05, overall model R2 = 0.56, P < 0.01, l-tailed.
Further, trait anxiety—as measured at the start of the SART
session—was directly associated with this TUTmeasure of intru-
sive off-task cognition, indexed 2–3 months later, r(16) = 0.42,
P = 0.05, 1-tailed.
Trait Anxiety and DLPFC Engagement in Brain Networks
Supporting the Maintenance of Sustained Attention
Versus off-Task Thought
Trait anxiety was linked to reduced functional connectivity
between right DLPFC and bilateral caudate and thalamus ROIs
across Go trials during EF (vs. Control) blocks, (Ps < 0.05 except
for right thalamus, where P = 0.053), Figure 4a,b. This is consist-
ent with reduced engagement of frontal-thalamo-striatal “loops”
in the proactive maintenance of sustained attention. In addition,
high trait anxiety was associated with increased connectivity
between right DLPFC and bilateral precuneus and posterior cin-
gulate ROIs across Go trials during SART EM (vs. Control)
blocks (Ps < 0.05, except for right posterior cingulate connec-
tivity, where P = 0.06), Figure 4c,d. This is consistent with pre-
vious ﬁndings of DLPFC and Default Mode co-activation during
spontaneous task unrelated thought. These ﬁndings provide
additional compelling evidence that the opposing patterns of
DLPFC activation linked to trait anxiety as a function of SART
performance reﬂect engagement of this region in different cog-
nitive processes, speciﬁcally the proactive control of sustained
attention versus off-task thought.
Worry and Frontal Activity During SART Performance
If trait anxious participants’ increased DLPFC activation and
elevated DLPFC-Default Mode connectivity for Go trials during
SART blocks where commission errors are made reﬂects in-
creased engagement in off-task thought, in particular occu-
pation with intrusive self-relevant concerns, we might expect
these patterns of regional brain activation and connectivity to
show an even closer relationship with a speciﬁc measure of
propensity to worry.
Scores on the PSWQ both signiﬁcantly predicted DLPFC
activity to Go trials during SART EM versus Control blocks,
Figure 4. Results from psychophysiological interaction (PPI) based functional connectivity analyses of DLPFC seeded connectivity as a function of block type and STAI trait anxiety.
Trait anxiety was signiﬁcantly associated with decreased connectivity between right DLPFC and bilateral caudate (a) and thalamus (b) ROIs across Go trials in Error-Free (EF) versus
Control (C) blocks. No signiﬁcant association between trait anxiety and connectivity between these regions was observed in Error-Made versus Control blocks. In addition, trait
anxiety was signiﬁcantly associated with increased connectivity between right DLPFC and bilateral precuneus (c) and posterior cingulate (d) ROIs across Go trials in Error-Made (EM)
versus Control (C) blocks. There was no signiﬁcant association between trait anxiety and connectivity between these regions in Error-Free versus Control blocks. DLPFC, dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex; STAI, Spielberger State Trait Anxiety Inventory.
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r(17) = 0.51, P < 0.05, Figure 5a, and mediated the relationship
between trait anxiety and this index of DLPFC activity, Sobel
Test, z = 1.70, P < 0.05, one-tailed. In contrast, worry was not
signiﬁcantly associated with DLPFC recruitment to Go trials in
SART EF (vs. Control) blocks (Fig. 5b), dACC or DLPFC activity
to Sart No Go trials, or RT measures of error-free performance
(all Ps > 0.1 except for DLPFC to No Go trials where P > 0.05).
This supports the contention that impoverished attentional
control and worry are independent facets of anxiety. Further-
more, when added to the regression model described in
Table 1a, PSWQ scores replaced DLPFC activity to Go trials in
SART EM blocks as a predictor of anxiety, and together with
DLPFC recruitment to Go trials during SART EF blocks (held to
primarily reﬂect proactive attentional control) jointly predicted
individual variability in trait anxiety (Table 1b).
Turning to the functional connectivity analyses, high PSWQ
scorers showed increased connectivity between right DLPFC
and bilateral precuenus and posterior cingulate ROIs during
SART EM (vs. Control) blocks (P ’s < 0.05), Figure 5c,d.
However, there was no signiﬁcant relationship between worry
and DLPFC connectivity with regions implicated in the proactive
maintenance of sustained attention (namely bilateral caudate
and thalamus ROIs) during EF (vs. Control) blocks (Ps > 0.1).
This suggests that while trait anxiety may be linked to altered
engagement of DLPFC in both the maintenance of sustained
attention (decreased) and task unrelated thought (increased),
worry may only be linked to altered DLPFC engagement in the
latter.
Discussion
Anxious individuals often report concentration problems and
high levels of worrying. To date, there has been little research
into the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying these symp-
toms of anxiety, or attempts to determine whether they reﬂect
disruption to one or more underlying processes. Concentration
problems may reﬂect deﬁcits in sustained attention. This aspect
of attentional function has not been extensively investigated
within the neuroimaging literature on anxiety. Hence, we
explored this here, using the well-established SART task
(Robertson et al. 1997). Our ﬁndings revealed that trait anxiety,
but not worry, was associated with impoverished recruitment of
frontal regions to support the proactive control of sustained
attention. Speciﬁcally, elevated STAI trait anxiety was linked to
diminished DLPFC activity, reduced connectivity within a
DLPFC-thalamo-striatal network previously implicated in the
ongoing maintenance and prioritization of task goals (Beiser
and Houk 1998; Frank et al. 2001), and slower responding on
Go trials in SART blocks without commission (No Go) errors.
This pattern is consistent with impoverished proactive control
Figure 5. Relationship between worry and frontal function. (a) PSWQ worry scores correlated positively with DLPFC activity on Go trials in the Error-Made (EM) versus Control (C)
blocks, showing a similar but stronger relation to trait anxiety, and statistically mediating the relationship between STAI trait scores and this index of DLPFC activity. (b) Unlike trait
anxiety, worry (PSWQ scores) did not show a signiﬁcant relationship with DLPFC activation on Go trials during SART Error-Free (EF) versus Control (C) blocks. (c,d) Worry (PSWQ
scores) was associated with increased connectivity between DLPFC and Default Mode regions—precuneus (c) and posterior cingulate (d) across Go trials in SART Error-Made (EM)
versus Control (C) blocks. There was no signiﬁcant association between worry and DLPFC connectivity with thalamus and caudate for Go trials during Error-Free (EF) versus Control
(C) blocks. DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; SART, Sustained Attention to Response Task; STAI, Spielberger State Trait Anxiety Inventory; PSWQ, Penn State Worry
Questionnaire.
Cerebral Cortex March 2015, V 25 N 3 615
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/cercor/article-abstract/25/3/609/346200 by guest on 22 O
ctober 2019
of attention resulting in RT slowing on Go trials being required
to maintain No Go accuracy levels. Our ﬁndings here are con-
sistent with prior suggestions that, in order to maintain perform-
ance levels, anxious participants compensate for impoverished
attentional control by reducing speed (Eysenck and Calvo
1992). However, contrary to brain-based translations of efﬁ-
ciency theory (Eysenck et al. 2007), this reduced speed of
accurate performance was linked to reduced, not increased,
activation in frontal regions.
Trait anxiety was also linked to reduced DLPFC and dACC
activity on trials requiring reactive control and response inhi-
bition (i.e., No Go trials). It is of note that we did not observe
an inverse relationship between trait anxiety and engagement
of frontal regions in proactive versus reactive control. In at
least the sustained attention task used here, impoverished re-
cruitment of both proactive and reactive control processes
seem to go hand in hand. Indeed, across individuals, ACC re-
cruitment on No Go trials was positively correlated with
DLPFC activity to Go trials in EF minus Control blocks, r
(17) = 0.58, P < 0.05. As in the case of proactive control, there
was no signiﬁcant relationship between worry (PSWQ scores)
and dACC or DLPFC activity to no go trials. These ﬁndings run
contrary to the suggestion that worry is tightly coupled with,
and possibly even secondary to, the disruption of frontal
control of attention observed in anxiety.
The occurrence of commission errors—failing to withhold
responses on No Go trials—may indicate that individuals are
attempting to maintain a Go trial response speed that is too fast
for inhibition of response on No Go trials to be effective. In
some individuals, however, it also reﬂects pre-occupation with
off-task thought (Christoff et al. 2009). Our ﬁndings revealed
that in task blocks containing commission errors, the relation-
ship between trait anxiety and DLPFC activity across Go trials
reversed. In these blocks, trait anxiety was positively linked
with DLPFC activity to Go trials. Evidence that this DLPFC acti-
vation may reﬂect a different process from DLPFC activity to
Go trials in blocks without commission errors was provided by
a hierarchical regression analysis which showed that these
indices of DLPFC activity had not only opposite but additive
effects in predicting trait anxiety.
Importantly, in task blocks containing commission errors,
worry (PSWQ scores) mediated the positive relationship
between trait anxiety and DLPFC activity. In addition, in these
blocks, both trait anxiety and worry were linked to increased
DLPFC functional connectivity with Default Mode regions impli-
cated in self-referent processing (precuneus, posterior cingu-
late). These connectivity ﬁndings provide support for our
proposal that increased anxiety and worry-related DLPFC
activity during blocks containing commission errors may reﬂect
spontaneous off-task self-referent thought. They also highlight
the value of connectivity analyses for providing insight
into within session and within condition changes in the func-
tional role of a given region due to altered engagement in on-
versus off-task processes, which could otherwise easily be
overlooked.
Overall, the ﬁndings reported here increase our understanding
of the relationship between anxiety and worry at both the neural
and cognitive level. They are consistent with information proces-
sing accounts that link worry to increased rates of stimulus-inde-
pendent, internally generated task unrelated thoughts; and
Figure 6. Illustration of the proposed relationship between trait anxiety, worry, attentional control, and generation of spontaneous self-referent thoughts. In this model, trait anxiety
is associated with both impoverished attentional control and increased worry, the latter being in turn linked to elevated levels of spontaneous thoughts about personal concerns. The
attentional control dimension is held to entail reduced engagement of DLPFC in a frontal-thalamo-striatal network that supports the proactive control of attention, as well as reduced
ACC and DLPFC engagement in reactive control (not shown here). The worry/spontaneous thought dimension is held to entail increased interaction between DLPFC and Default
Mode regions implicated in self-referent processing, in particular the precuneus and posterior cingulate. Of note, worry is not directly associated with impoverished attentional
control. A possibility that requires additional investigation is that individual variation in both these dimensions might contribute to the extent to which disruptive task-unrelated
mind-wandering, focused on self-related concerns, occurs during attempts to perform everyday tasks. DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex.
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suggest that this may involve an interplay between regions of the
brain that support self-referential processing and others (namely,
DLPFC) that have been implicated in reasoning (Goel and Dolan
2003). Critically, our results suggest that while this worry-related
processing is elevated in trait anxious individuals, it is indepen-
dent of anxiety-related impoverished recruitment of frontal atten-
tional control mechanisms. This suggests that worry is not merely
a secondary symptom to impoverished frontal control of attention
in anxiety. It is similarly inconsistent with the reverse proposal
that elevated levels of worry account, through competition for
common limited processing resources, for anxiety-related deﬁcits
in attentional control (Eysenck and Calvo 1992).
By highlighting and disentangling the dual roles of DLPFC in
attentional control and spontaneous task unrelated thought, we
provide initial support for a new model of the relationship
between anxiety, worry, and frontal dysfunction (Fig. 6). Ac-
cording to this model, worry is independent of trait anxiety-
related deﬁcits in DLPFC engagement in the proactive control of
sustained attention (as well as deﬁcits in ACC engagement in re-
active control). One intriguing possibility is that this model may
provide a potential non-circular account for why worry is per-
ceived as more “pathological”—i.e., more disruptive and distres-
sing—in patients with ADs (Olatunji et al. 2011). Speciﬁcally,
this might reﬂect the position an individual falls on 2 distinct di-
mensions of function, one pertaining to elevated spontaneous
generation of self-referent negative thoughts and the other to
impoverished attentional control, both involving alteration in
DLPFC function but being differently characterized by DLPFC
interaction with regions belonging to Default Mode versus atten-
tional brain networks. Very preliminary evidence for this propo-
sal comes from the ﬁnding that the DLPFC indices held to tap
these 2 dimensions jointly predicted the level of intrusive TUTs
reported by participants in a vigilance task with thought probes
conducted during the follow-up session. Additional exploration
of this is needed, but we hope that the model described here pro-
vides an empirically testable framework of value to future investi-
gation of altered brain networks in anxiety and worry, and
associated proﬁles of disruption to cognitive processing. It is
hoped that this will in turn facilitate the development of theoreti-
cally grounded cognitive interventions aimed at tackling the
symptoms of poor concentration and worry which contribute to
the distress and dysfunction experienced by anxious individuals.
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